An older European-Enlightenment geopolitical imagination was lost in the late nineteenth century with the rise of naturalized understandings of inter-state and imperial relations that saw states and empires in terms of biological competition conditioned by relative location on the earth's surface. The word "geopolitics" emerged in that context and since that time the term has had to contend with this original sin. Arguably, however, Montesquieu and Voltaire in their references to Alexander the Great had a somewhat different conception of geopolitics in mind: one in which reciprocity and exchange between places as well as the redistribution of resources from colonies to homeland are at work. It is this broader sense of the word that has been revived over the past fifty years in the course of attempts at linking the global political structure of states, empires, and other political authorities to what can be called the "globalization era."
The broader understanding of geopolitics is by no means restricted to this era, as the reference to the Enlightenment period should make clear. But it has become an increasingly attractive alternative. I discuss four aspects of the connection between geopolitics construed in the broader meaning and the globalization that the world economy has experienced over the past fifty years. The first is to challenge the idea that geopolitics in the broad sense is "opposed" to globalization. I then turn to what I see are the three dimensions of geopolitics in an era of globalization: the geopolitics of globalization, the geopolitics of development, and the geopolitics of global regulation.
From this perspective, Montesquieu and Voltaire offer a much better inspiration for understanding world politics than do the geopolitical writers of the early twentieth century such as Kjellen and Mackinder.
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The famous European-Enlightenment philosophers Montesquieu and Voltaire saw the ancient Macedonian Emperor Alexander the Great in his day as having created a "great revolution" by having changed the "face of commerce" across the world as then known. Writing in the eighteenth century, they understood "commerce" very widely: it referred not only to economic and intellectual exchange between places but also to the reciprocal relations and exchanges among peoples, states and sexes. Perhaps
Alexander's greatest virtue was that even as he conquered he was held to have respected the customs of those he conquered and encouraged commerce rather than the territorial stasis Enlightenment historiography associated with the Persian Empire. Alexander provided a model for eighteenth-century European empire-builders to emulate (Briant 2012 ). This imagination was lost in the late nineteenth century with the rise of naturalized understandings of interstate and imperial relations that saw states and empires in terms of biological competition conditioned by relative location on the earth's surface. The word "geopolitics" emerged in that context and since that time the term has had to contend with this original sin. Arguably, however, Montesquieu and Voltaire in their references to Alexander the Great had a somewhat different conception of geopolitics in mind: one in which reciprocity and exchange between places as well as the redistribution of resources from colonies to homeland are at work. It is this broader sense of the word that has been revived over the past fifty years in the course of attempts at linking the global political structure of states, empires, and other political authorities to what can be called the "globalization era" (Agnew 2003) .
In this chapter I discuss four aspects of the connection between geopolitics construed in this broader meaning and the globalization that the world economy has experienced over the past fifty years. The first is to challenge the idea that geopolitics is "opposed" to globalization. This contention reflects adherence to the territorial "necessity" of state-imperial expansion characteristic of classical nineteenth century understanding of geopolitics (Agnew and Corbridge 1995) . I then turn to what I see are the three dimensions of geopolitics in an era of globalization: the geopolitics of globalization, the geopolitics of development, and the geopolitics of global regulation.
These, respectively, involve discussing the role of the United States in enabling and 
GEOPOLITICS VERSUS GLOBALIZATION
It is common to see geopolitics and globalization as opposites with respect to how the world works. If the former is associated primarily with geographical determinism in channeling the universal urge for territorial expansion on the part of all states, the latter is seen as creating an interdependent and "flat" world in which flows of goods, people and capital displace the territorialized world of inter-imperial rivalries that characterized the past. Brian Blouet (2001) has devoted an entire book to justifying this opposition. He writes: "Geopolitical policies seek to establish national or imperial control over space and the resources, routeways, industrial capacity and population the territory contains,' whereas "globalization is the opening of national space to the free flow of goods, capital, and ideas. Globalization removes obstructions to movement and creates conditions in which international trade in goods and services can expand" (Blouet 2001, 1 ). Yet, historically such a clear-cut distinction makes little sense.
Certainly, the period from 1875 until 1945 can be reasonably characterized as one in which inter-imperial rivalry tended to win out over open trade and so and the Cold War from 1945 until 1991 involved a major geopolitical fracture between a relatively freeflowing West and a relatively autarchic East. Classic geopolitics developed in the first period and represented an effort at justifying imperialism in naturalistic terms of space and race (Ashworth 2013) . But right across the periods in question there were systematic efforts on the part of some governments, particularly in Britain and the United States, and businesses looking to expand beyond home shores, to reduce and remove barriers to trade and investment. These increasingly came to fruition during the Cold War and since the 1990s have expanded to include much of the world.
Globalization, then, was incipient within the territorialized conflicts of the twentieth [legally] guaranteed, but not its substance, i.e. not the social and economic content of territorial integrity" (Schmitt 2003 (Schmitt [1950 , 252 quoted in Coleman 2011, 137) .
It is useful perhaps to make the case for the geopolitics of globalization in empirical terms. Using different terminology, a range of features of contemporary world politics can be ascribed to geopolitics. These include the incidence of interstate conflicts, the occurrence of civil wars, and the unevenness of economic development around the world. These always have putative geopolitical as well as economic causes. In other words, that acts of governments and other public and private authorities have profound effects on both country-by-country and local differences in conflict potential and economic development. Globalization is also thus far from being a spontaneous, purely economic process. It is also the progeny of geopolitical action. Three ways in which geopolitics underpins globalization can be identified as constituting geopolitics in the era of globalization. The first, at the global level, is the geopolitics of globalization or Understanding "Geopolitics" in an Era of Globalization John Agnew
Rev. Tamoios, São Gonçalo (RJ), ano 11, n. 2, págs. 04-21, jul/dez. 2015 9 the way in which the world's most powerful state for the past seventy years, the United States, has facilitated the opening up of the world economy. This has obviously not been without resistance as can be seen, for example, in the Arab World, with efforts by militant Islamist groups to turn away from any paradigm of modernity as irredeemably tainted by its foreign and/or Western origins and in Russian government efforts to reestablish Russia as a regional hegemon even if this imposes massive costs on its own territorial economy. The contemporary world is not one without contradictions. The second, at the national level, is the geopolitics of development with reference to the differences between states with respect to their mobilization of populations to pursue economic development and the investment in public goods and infrastructures to enable this pursuit. In the face of globalization, some countries, China and South Korea would be examples, have managed to reorganize their economies to benefit from the changes.
Other governments have been much less able and willing to do so. The final is the increasingly complex system under globalization of what can be called "low geopolitics" or the economic-regulatory activities carried out by relatively independent private and public agencies and the emergence of intermediary jurisdictions particularly tax havens and global financial centers in world cities through which the invoices of world trade and investment increasingly circulate. This is geopolitics without the drama of military strategies involving carrier task forces and so on but with real impacts on everyday lives around the world.
GEOPOLITICS OF GLOBALIZATION
Globalization as we understand it today began in the nineteenth century, even if it had earlier roots in European colonial expansion (Wallerstein et al. 2013 ). The But a number of different strategies can make sense depending on size of economy (population, infrastructure demands, etc.), resource base, governmental Understanding "Geopolitics" in an Era of Globalization John Agnew
Rev. Tamoios, São Gonçalo (RJ), ano 11, n. 2, págs. 04-21, jul/dez. 2015 15 structure, and governmental efficacy. Large home economies allow for both economies of scale in production/consumption and import substitution. Historically, Brazil, India, and Mexico followed this approach. Russia, after having flirted with the world economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union, may be heading back in this direction. Regional supra-national authorities such as the European Union and NAFTA can provide such benefits while also maintaining state-level autonomy of various sorts. Countries with large resource bases, particularly ones with relatively inelastic demand but subject to depletion (such as oil), can bank on using sovereign-wealth funds to invest in assets both nationally and globally (Xu and Bahgat 2011). Many of the world's major oilproducing countries, from Kuwait and Venezuela to Norway, have such funds. But countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, China, and South Korea have also followed this strategy to a degree. Smaller states can turn themselves into tax havens. Some US states (such as Delaware and Wyoming), Caribbean island neo-colonies (such as the Cayman Islands), Luxembourg, Switzerland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Britain (since the 1980s) have taken on at least some of the attributes of tax havens: allowing foreign companies and wealthy persons the advantages of domiciliary status to lower or eliminate income taxes, facilitating tax inversions (after mergers or acquisitions moving to the lowest tax jurisdiction available), and through transfer-price invoicing lowering taxes by means of booking revenues to the lowest tax jurisdiction in which a corporate subsidiary is located (frequently solely for this purpose) (Shaxson 2011) . Obviously, these development strategies tend to be at the expense of other jurisdictions. But the lobbying power of the businesses and individuals that benefit from them is such in those other jurisdictions that little or nothing can be done to eliminate the tax avoidance strategies upon which they are based.
At the other end of the continuum of development are many quasi-or even "failed" states that are unable to manage the possibilities on offer from globalization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Jackson 1993) . Some of this incapacity can be put down to the colonial histories of many state, particularly the lack of mapping between nation on the one hand and state on the other. While corruption is hardly a monopoly of such regimes, it is endemic in many post-colonial states, at least in part because of seeing government office almost entirely as a source of patronage. Colonies that later became independent states were often carved out by colonial powers (such as Britain, France, Spain, and so on) with little or no attention to their ethnic or national Whatever the precise strategy of development chosen, it is clear that economic growth in the era of globalization depends crucially on the capacity to find a niche within the wider global economy. While this is particularly true for smaller states, larger ones can also benefit enormously from collective mobilization on behalf of clear goals. The structural impediments imposed by global geopolitical realities, however, make some options more available than others. For a large subset of the world's states, particularly those with the most negative and long lasting colonial experiences, largely located in Africa and the Middle East, the fruits of globalization, if they are such, remain a distant goal.
GEOPOLITICS OF REGULATION
With the onset of globalization since the 1970s, world economic development is increasingly regulated not just by governments within countries but also by increasingly influential private, quasi-public and international organizations. Arguably the growth in private and quasi-public agencies is the product of the erosion of the public-private divide with the revolving door in personnel between government and private business, popular and business hostility (particularly in the United States) to government regulation (at least before the financial collapse of 2008), the absence of much intergovernmental regulation, and the explosion of transnational transactions to which established states are ill-equipped to respond (Cooley and Spruyt 2009 Source: based on Büthe and Mattli (2011) In the second case, most national central banks today have a high degree of political independence from their governments. For example, the Bank of England, long subject to close supervision by the British Treasury, has been independent of such influence since 1997. The European Central bank, invented in 1999 to govern the new Euro currency, likewise exercises a power separate from that of the member states in the Eurozone (the 17 members of the European Union that since 1999 have come to share the same currency). This means that they make decisions about how much currency to issue, interest rates, and exchange rate supports with an eye on global markets rather than just their own governments. At the same time, much of the world's private financial economy is increasingly moving "offshore" to avoid as much national and global regulation as possible (see Table 1 ). To take advantage of low or nonexistent corporate and personal income taxes, many transnational businesses now incorporate in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands. Major global financial institutions in New York and London provide the nerve centers for this cross-jurisdictional circulation of corporate profits. Central banks increasingly try to coordinate their activities to manage these offshore flows. In the Bank for International Settlements they even have their own joint bank to coordinate their efforts at regulating global finance (Lebor 2013) . The contradiction between the desire of large countries with dependent populations and development plans to retain tax revenues and the increasing desire and opportunity of wealthy individuals and businesses to avoid or evade taxes plagues the contemporary system of international financial regulation. A major crisis is brewing in that the massive avoidance of taxes not only creates opportunities for "money laundering" of illegal activities, it also reduces the revenues that governments need in providing the public investments necessary for successful economic development. 
CONCLUSION

